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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Randall Steven Rothwell appeals from the district court's Sentencing Disposition
and Notice of Right to Appeal, Order Retaining Jurisdiction. Mr. Rothwell asserts that
the district court abused its discretion in prohibiting two character witnesses from
testifying about their general opinion of Mr. Rothwell's trustworthiness with pre-teen
children.

The District court held that the testimony was inadmissible because the

trustworthiness of the Mr. Rothwell is not an element of the charged offense, that the
evidence was not probative or had very limited probative value, that the evidence was
not evidence of a pertinent character trait, and that any limited probative value was
outweighed by unfair prejudice, especially in light of the likeliness of confusing the jury.
Mr. Rothwell asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to prohibit
the introduction of the character evidence.
Further, Mr. Rothwell asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
allowing the presentation of Plaintiff's Exhibit 21, a photograph of a lawn chair with a
smiley face and a tongue sticking out, and in allowing the State to question
Mrs. Rothwell, Mr. Rothwell's mother, in great detail about the chair.
asserts that the lawn chair had no relevance to the case at hand.

Mr. Rothwell

Alternatively, he

asserts any potential relevance was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Additionally, Mr. Rothwell asserts that the State committed prosecutorial
misconduct which deprived Mr. Rothwell of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty
to see that Mr. Rothwell had a fair trial by appealing to the passions and prejudices of
the jury and by misrepresenting evidence presented to the jury. Mr. Rothwell contends
that the misconduct committed in his case was either preserved by objection or
constituted fundamental error and that the errors are not harmless.
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Further, Mr. Rothwell contends the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished jurisdiction over his case. He also contends the district court abused its
discretion when it sentenced him to twenty-five years, with six years fixed and when it
failed to reduce this sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On August 2B, 2009, an Information was filed charging Mr. Rothwell with one
count of lewd conduct. (R., pp.35-36.) The charges were the result of a report to police
that Mr. Rothwell had engaged a minor, A.N., in oral to genital contact. (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.1.)

Mr. Rothwell entered a not guilty plea.

(R., pp.37-40.)

Mr. Rothwell filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the introduction of
information regarding "calculations by the Ohio lab to the effect that the alleles found in
the DNA testing cannot eliminate Randy Rothwell as a contributor to the non-sperm part
of the mixture (from more than one person) found on the child's face" be prohibited.
(R., pp.B3-B6.) Specifically, counsel argued that the information would confuse the jury,

was a waste of time, resulted in unfair prejudice, and is not supported by a scientific
basis.

(R., pp.B4-B6.)

Later, the motion was supplemented with argument that the

evidence was not relevant as "showing at most an inference of possible non-sexual
contact between Randy and A.N., will not assist the jury in deciding whether sexual
activity took place. The Ohio evidence does not make sexual contact more probable or
less probable [than] without the Ohio evidence." (R., pp.9B-103.) The district court held
a hearing on the motion. (R., pp.1 05-1 OB.) After hearing argument on the motion, the
district court ruled that it was denying the motion in limine because: that it was untimely,
and because the court did not have enough information about what the witnesses were
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going to testify to in order to determine relevance. (Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.20.) The
district court noted that it may be addressed at a later time if an opportunity presented
itself. (Tr., p.17, Ls.S-20.)
The case proceeded to trial. The State's first witness was Ms. Farrah Arneson,
the nurse who completed the sexual assault kit on the alleged victim, including taking
oral and facial swabs. (Tr., p.S4, LS.6 - p.68, L.2S.) Next, Officer Shardell Ellis testified
that she responded to the call from Marian Noonan, the alleged victim's mother, and
collected AN.'s clothing and the completed sexual assault kit. (Tr., p.72, L.1 - p.79,
L.7.)

Deputy Oyler testified that he sent the sexual assault kit and biological samples

from Mr. Rothwell to the Idaho State laboratory. (Tr., p.79, L.17 - p.89, L.1S.)
Ms. Rylene Nowlin then presented the DNA conclusions from the Idaho State
Police Forensic Service Laboratory.

(Tr., p.91, L.11 - p.138, L.3.) Specifically, she

noted that there were sperm found in the swab taken from AN.'s cheek; however, the
lab was unable to obtain a profile, other than AN.'s, from the sample. (Tr., p.112, L.23
- p.115, L.17.) On cross-examination, Ms. Nowlin stated that Mr. Rothwell had been
excluded as being a contributor to the DNA sample that was analyzed. (Tr., p.117, L.24
- p.118, L.13.)

The alleles that were foreign to AN. were not consistent with

Mr. Rothwell's DNA (Tr., p.134, Ls.1-14.)
Jessica York, an employee of the DNA Diagnostics Center, located in Ohio, then
testified about her training and evaluation of evidence in the case at hand. (Tr., p.139,
L.9 - p.173, L.13.) Ms. York explained that the Ohio lab is able to complete Y-STR
testing, DNA testing that focuses on the Y chromosome found only in males.
(Tr., p.149, Ls.14-24.)

Prior to offering testimony regarding the analysis of evidence

related to the case at hand, defense counsel objected based upon relevance,
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foundation, unfair prejudice, and "et cetera, that we argued about this morning [at the
motion in limine hearing]."

(Tr., p.150, Ls. 8-24.)

The objection was overruled.

(Tr., p.150, L.25 - p.151, L.1.) Defense counsel was granted a continuing objection to
the evidence. (Tr., p.151, Ls.11-15.) All of the samples tested came back as negative,
no semen identified. (Tr., p.155, Ls.3-20.) The samples were then combined together
and a differential extraction preformed, creating two fractions, a non-sperm and sperm
fraction. (Tr., p.156, Ls.1-6.) She was able to generate a DNA profile from the nonsperm fraction, but not the sperm fraction. (Tr., p.156, Ls.7-16.) The lab was unable to
exclude Mr. Rothwell as a contributor to the non-sperm DNA. (Tr., p.157, Ls.1-11.) The
profiles found showed that more than one individual, two or more males, had
contributed to the sample. (Tr., p.168, Ls.20-25.) Out of seventeen locations tested,
results were only obtained for five loci. (Tr., p.170, Ls.11-21.)
Next, Dr. Michael Baird, a geneticist at the Ohio lab, testified about his training,
experience, and explained Y chromosome analysis. (Tr., p.176, L.21 - p.206, L.1.)
Dr. Baird concluded that, "the partial profile that was obtained from the evidentiary
sample is a mixture of more than one individual, and that the primary profile in the
partial profile of the non-sperm fraction matches that of the defendant." (Tr., p .212,
L.22 - p.213, L.1.) Dr. Baird agreed that the DNA could have been transferred from
A.N. touching an item that had come into contact with the fluid and then touching her
face.

(Tr., p .214, Ls.18-24.)

The doctor also admitted that the frequency rate of

occurrence of a match when sixteen of sixteen markers is typically in the billions, but in
the case at hand, matching only five markers, the rate was one in 126. (Tr., p.222, L.18
- p.223, L.9.)
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The alleged victim's mother, Marian Noonan, then testified generally about her
daughter, where AN. lives, who provides cares for AN., and her past relationship with
her neighbors, including Mr. Rothwell. (Tr., p.229, L.16 - p.241, L.7.) On the date of
the alleged incident, Ms. Noonan picked AN. up from school, took her home, AN. then
asked if she could go play with the Rothwell's dog, and was allowed to go outside.
(Tr., p.244, L.1 - p.246, L.9.)

At some point, Ms. Noonan noticed that AN. was not

within view, she began calling for her, and eventually AN. came out the back door of
the Rothwell's house.

(Tr., p.246, L.15 - p. 248, L.22.) When she came out of the

house she allegedly made a statement about Mr. Rothwell having her lick his penis,
Mr. Rothwell then made a comment about her imagination, and then AN. and
Mr. Rothwell went back into the house. (Tr., p.249, L.4 - p.250, L.5.) After processing
what happened, Ms. Noonan went over and got AN., confirmed with AN. what she had
said, and then called the police. (Tr., p.250, L.7 - p.251, L.11.)
AN. then testified that while in Mr. Rothwell's room she licked and rubbed his
penis.

(Tr., p.272, L.14 - p.275, L.25.)

On cross-examination, defense counsel

impeached AN. by asking her about several odd statements she allegedly made to
police, i.e. that the penis was green and cold. (Tr., p.283, L.4 - p.288, L.18.)
Detective Oyler was then allowed to testify about his interview with AN.
regarding statements that were different that those made at trial and those that were
consistent. (Tr., p.295, LS.18 - p.312, L.21.) When defense counsel objected to the
questioning about consistent statements, the prosecution stated that they were offered
to rehabilitate AN. after cross examination pointing out inconsistent statements, the
objection was overruled. (Tr., 310, L.18 - p.311, L.13.)
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Ms. Peightal, A.N.'s daycare provider, testified that A.N. did not come into
contact with any males on the date in question while at daycare. (Tr., p.322, L.21 p.327, L.15.)
The State then rested. (Tr., p.328, L.5.)
Prior to presenting any testimony, the State objected to proposed witnesses
Nicole and Devin McConnell. (Tr., p.330, L.8 - p.331, L.7.) Defense counsel stated
that the witnesses were there to present character evidence, opinion testimony that
Mr. Rothwell was trustworthy with pre-teen children, admissible under Idaho Rules of
Evidence 404(a)(1) and 405. (Tr., p.331, L.10 - p.333, L.7.) The district court held that
the testimony was inadmissible because the trustworthiness of the Mr. Rothwell is not
an element of the charged offense and because the testimony may confuse the jury.
(Tr., p.334, L.3 - p.335, L.10.)
Defense counsel then presented the testimony of Terri Rothwell, Mr. Rothwell's
mother regarding where they lived, what Mr. Rothwell's room looked like, the events of
that day, and several phone discussions she had with Mr. Rothwell while the incident
was alleged to have occurred. (Tr., p.338, L.17 - p.352, L.12.)
At the start of the next day, the district court revisited the ruling about
Mr. Rothwell's character witnesses.

The district court specifically found that the

evidence was not probative or had very limited probative value, that the evidence was
not evidence of a pertinent character trait, and any limited probative value is outweighed
by unfair prejudice, especially in light of the likeliness of confusing the jury. (Tr., p .363,
L.21 - p.368, L.8.)
The defense then continued with the presentation of Mrs. Rothwell's testimony.
(Tr., p.370, Ls.1-5.) On cross-examination, over objection, the State elicited testimony
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and submitted a photograph regarding a lawn chair with a smiley face and a tongue
sticking out. (Tr., p.378, LA - p.386, L.1.)
The last witness was Mr. Rothwell.
anything improper with A.N.

Mr. Rothwell stated that he had not done

(Tr., pA10, Ls.14-21.)

testimony, Deputy Ellis was called to testify.

In the middle of Mr. Rothwell's

(Tr., pA36, Ls.12-19.)

During his

testimony, the State elicited, over a hearsay objection, testimony that Ms. Noonan had
made consistent statements about the events of the day in question to him. (Tr., pA41,
LA - pA42, L.6.)

The state asserted it was offering the statements as prior consistent

statements, to rehabilitate the witness. (Tr., pA42, Ls.22-25.)
Following Mr. Rothwell's testimony, the defense rested. (Tr., pA57, L.8.) The
State offered two very brief rebuttal witnesses.

(Tr., pA57, L.23 - pA66, L.18.)

Mr. Rothwell then briefly took the stand again. (Tr., pA67, L.1 - pA73, L.5.)
Later, the jury returned a guilty verdict. (R., p.205.)
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel requested an eight to twelve year
sentence, with retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.569, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Rothwell was sentenced to
a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with six years fixed, and the district court
retained jurisdiction for one year.

(R., pp.274-277.)

Mr. Rothwell filed a Notice of

Appeal timely from the Sentencing Disposition and Notice of Right to Appeal, Order
Retaining Jurisdiction. (Augmentation: Notice of Appeal.)
In May of 2011, the district court extended the period of retained jurisdiction to a
full year.

(Augmentation: Retained Jurisdiction Disposition and Notice of Right to

Appeal, 5/17/11.)
jurisdiction.

Ultimately, in November of 2011, the district court relinquished

(Augmentation:

Retained Jurisdiction Disposition and Notice of Right to

Appeal, 11/30/11.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it prohibited Mr. Rothwell from
presenting the testimony of Nicole and Devin McConnell, character witnesses for
the defense?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in allowing the State to introduce a
photograph of a lawn chair and question Mr. Rothwell's mother about the chair
because it was not relevant evidence or was overly prejudicial?

3.

Did the State violate Mr. Rothwell's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct?

4.

Was Mr. Rothwell's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law violated
because the accumulation of errors in his trial deprived him of his right to a fair
trial?

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Rothwell?

6.

Alternatively, did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced
Mr. Rothwell to a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with six years fixed, and
when it failed to reduce his sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Prohibited Mr. Rothwell From
Presenting The Testimony Of Nicole And Devin McConnell. Character Witnesses For
The Defense

A.

Introduction
Defense counsel sought to introduce the testimony of Nicole and Devin

McConnell. Both witnesses were offered to testify that they had known Mr. Rothwell for
several years, had seen Mr. Rothwell interact with children, and based upon their
experiences, they had the opinion that Mr. Rothwell is trustworthy with pre-teen
children.

The District court held that the testimony was inadmissible because the

trustworthiness of Mr. Rothwell is not an element of the charged offense, that the
evidence was not probative or had very limited probative value, that the evidence was
not evidence of a pertinent character trait, and any limited probative value was
outweighed by unfair prejudice, especially in light of the likeliness of confusing the jury.
Mr. Rothwell asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to prohibit
the introduction of the character evidence.
B.

Standard Of Review
A court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009). An appellate court reviewing a district court's
discretionary decision engages in a three part analysis: First, whether the district court
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; second, whether the court acted within
the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and
third, whether the court reached is decision through an exercise of reason.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 (1989).
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State v.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Prohibited Mr. Rothwell From
Presenting The Testimony Of Nicole And Devin McConnell, Character Witnesses
For The Defense
Prior to presenting any testimony, the State objected to proposed witnesses

Nicole and Devin McConnell. (Tr., p.330, L.8 - p.331, L.7.) Defense counsel stated
that the witnesses were there to present character evidence, opinion testimony that
Mr. Rothwell was trustworthy with pre-teen children, admissible under Idaho Rules of
Evidence 404(a)(1) and 405. (Tr., p.331, L.10 - p.333, L.7.) The district court held that
the testimony was inadmissible because the trustworthiness of Mr. Rothwell is not an
element of the charged offense and because the testimony may confuse the jury.
(Tr., p.334, L.3 - p.335, L.1 0.)
At the start of the next day, the district court revisited the ruling about
Mr. Rothwell's character witnesses. Specifically, the district court held that:
All right. Well, 404(a)(1) allows something, but I don't know that it allows it
in the present case. 404(a)(1) allows the character of the accused.
Evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's character offered by an
accused, which satisfies in this case, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, and I am still left with the belief that this element of trustworthiness
around minor female children is not an element of the crime or an element
of any defense.
I agree somewhat with Mr. Verharen's argument that you're not
supposed to look at specific instances of conduct. Well, sounds like these
two people would have an opinion as to his trustworthiness around minor
female children, specifically their daughter. Well, what's that opinion
based on? Well, the opinion's based on nothing but specific instances of
conduct which is not what you're supposed to get into, because then you
get into mini trials on collateral issues that distract and confuse the jury,
and even if the opinion evidence where to come in without foundation, in
other words, the specific instances of conduct, then the prosecutor can get
into those specific instances of conduct, and then we're off doing
specifically what the Rules of Evidence tell us that we shouldn't be doing,
and that is talking about reputation for a certain pertinent character traits
through specific instances of conduct.
I'm just going to read into the record my notes because I think this
is a close issue, it's an issue obviously vested in the Court's discretion,
10

and I think it's an important issue here. I guess the bottom line, though, is
I'm convinced that it isn't probative, and it would serve to distract the jury.
. . . in any event, just looking at Rule 404 and Rule 405 I think it's
improper.

I'm simply not seeing any probative value here or certainly very,
very little, and again that's because we're talking about the defendant's
friends who don't see the defendant in isolated settings with a minor who
don't witness any bad acts, and "" leave it at that. I think I've done what I
can. I simply don't find there to be a pertinent character trait due to the
elements of the crime charged. I don't find it to be relevant, and even if
there were any limited relevance, the probative value's outweighed by the
likeliness of confusion or misleading the jury, so that's my ruling.
(Tr., p .363, L.21 - p.368, L.8.) In making its ruling, the district court relied on State v.
Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350, 353-54 (Utah
1985); and State v. Rhodes, 219 Ariz. 476, 200 P.3d 973 (Ct. App. 2008).
Mr. Rothwell asserts that the district court abused its discretion in prohibiting the
introduction of the offered character testimony.

Evidence is relevant if it has any

tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the litigation more
probable or less probable, and such evidence is generally admissible. I.R.E. 401, 402.
Criminal defendants have long been entitled to offer evidence of good character to show
that he did not commit the crime for which he is charged. Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 15556; State v. Dobbins, 102 Idaho 706 (1981). Before the adoption of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence, proof of character was limited to the defendant's reputation in the community.
Id.

The Rules of Evidence permit a defendant to prove good character either by

reputation or by opinion testimony.

I.R.E. 405.

However, proof of good character

through specific instances of good conduct is impermissible under both the rules and
general case law. 1 I.R.E. 404(a)(1) and 405(a); Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 155-56.

1

I.R.E. 404(a) states that:
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In State v. Lawrence, the Court held that Ms. Lawrence's offered character
evidence, the "act" of finding her husband committing lewd acts and noting that he
stopped when she came around, was not a really an act at all, was remote in time,
would be character evidence based upon specific acts, was not relevant to show that
she did not have a common plan or scheme to commit lewd conduct, and was not
relevant for intent because the defense was that the lewd conduct did not happen, not
that it was an accident. Id. at 155-56. This case provides little insight to the issue at
hand.

Mr. Rothwell offered

limited opinion testimony regarding Mr. Rothwell's

trustworthiness with pre-teen children, not information about specific instances of
conduct. Although the opinions would be based upon the McConnell's observations of
Mr. Rothwell and his reputation, all opinions are based upon such information. As long
as the testimony was limited to reputation or general opinions, not the specific instances

Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible
for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same

Idaho Rule of Evidence 405 states that:
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by
testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of
conduct.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or
defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of the person's
conduct.
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of contact, the opinions were admissible and are admissible under the logic and legal
analysis used in Lawrence.
The district court also relied upon State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350, 353-54 (Utah
1985). In Miller, after analyzing Utah's similar rules of evidence 404 and 405, the court
determined that, "Since the defendant's character is not an element of the crime of
sexually abusing a child, the appellant was limited to reputation or opinion testimony to
prove good moral character." Id. While the court disallowed specific evidence of past
conduct, it did allow opinion and reputation testimony regarding the defendant's honesty
and truthfulness and would have allowed opinion and reputation testimony with respect
to moral character.

Id. As such, Miller allows for the admission of the general

information sought to be admitted by Mr. Rothwell.
Further, in State v. Rhodes, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that a
Defendant's sexual normalcy, or appropriateness in interacting with children, is a
character trait, and one that pertains to charges of sexual conduct with a child. Rhodes,
219 Ariz. at 479. Lay witness opinion and reputation testimony that the defendant was
sexually normal, and conducted himself appropriately around children would not deprive
the jury of its role in evaluating credibility and guilt or innocence. Id.
The court went on to note that:
The trial court, in ruling on the motion in limine, erroneously
precluded the witnesses' opinions on Defendant's character trait for sexual
normalcy, relying on Rule 405(b), which permits proof of specific instances
of conduct only when the character or trait of character is an "essential
element" of a charge, claim or defense. In his motion, Defendant had
sought only to offer opinion and reputation testimony as to his sexual
normalcy pursuant to Rule 405(a), albeit based on the witnesses'
observations of his conduct around children. A defendant is allowed to
offer opinion and reputation testimony, as long as the character trait is
"pertinent" to the charge, as it is in this case. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a)(1),
405(a). The pre-trial ruling was, therefore, incorrect as a matter of law to
the extent it summarily excluded the proffered opinion and reputation
13

testimony. The trial judge, as a result, did not abuse her discretion when
she granted a new trial on the basis that the pre-trial ruling was erroneous
on a matter of law. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 24.1 (c)(4).
To the extent that the trial judge characterized sexual deviancy as
an "element of the crime" in granting the new trial, however, she erred.
Although sexual normalcy is pertinent to the charged offense, sexual
deviancy is not an element of the crime of, and sexual normalcy is not an
element of the defense to, sexual conduct with a minor.... Accordingly,
although Defendant's witnesses may testify that their opinions as to his
sexual normalcy were based on their observations of his appropriate
behavior with children, they may not testify as to specific acts or instances
of Defendant's conduct pursuant to Rule 405(b).

Id. at 479-80.
As such, all three of the cases the district court relied upon stand for the
proposition that opinion testimony regarding Mr. Rothwell's appropriate behavior with
pre-teen children is admissible character evidence. Similarly, Idaho Rules of Evidence
404 and 405 provide for the admittance of this type of limited testimony. Evidence as to
Mr. Rothwell's appropriate behavior with children is relevant to a pertinent character trait
as he is charged with engaging in inappropriate behavior with a child.

Information

regarding two individuals' opinions regarding Mr. Rothwell's trustworthiness with
children would not confuse the jury. Jurors are fully capable of understanding this type
of opinion testimony and of properly applying the testimony.

While Mr. Rothwell

concedes that testimony about specific instances of conduct is not admissible, he
asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to prohibit the McConnells
from offering character opinion testimony.
1.

The Admittance Of The Evidence Was Not Harmless Error

The United States Supreme Court has described the harmless error doctrine as
follows:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
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judgment should stand... But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from
the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it
is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The
inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result,
apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether
the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave
doubt, the conviction cannot stand.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,765 (1946) (citation omitted). Harmless error
is defined in Rule 52 of the Idaho Criminal Rules as, "Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." The harmless
error doctrine has been further defined by this Court: "To hold an error as harmless, an
appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction."
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967)).
Mr. Rothwell contends that this error was not harmless. Because there was a
timely objection, Mr. Rothwell only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at
which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). The State cannot
show the error was harmless in this case.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Allowing The State To Introduce A
Photograph Of A Lawn Chair And Question Mr. Rothwell'S Mother About The Chair
Because It Was Not Relevant Evidence Or Was Overly Prejudicial
A.

Introduction
During trial, the State was allowed to present Plaintiff's Exhibit 21, a photograph

of a lawn chair with a smiley face and a tongue sticking out.

The State was also

allowed to question Ms. Rothwell, Mr. Rothwell's mother in great detail about the chair.
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Mr. Rothwell asserts that the lawn chair has no relevance to the case at hand.
Alternatively, he asserts any potential relevance is outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of

discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
564 (2007) (citing State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112 (2005)).

This Court must

examine whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2)
the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with
applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an
exercise of reason. Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119
Idaho 87, 94 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)).
determinations of relevancy are reviewed de novo.

However,

State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,

218 (Ct. App. 2009).
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Allowing The State To Introduce A
Photograph Of A Lawn Chair And Question Mr. Rothwell's Mother About The
Chair Because It Was Not Relevant Evidence Or Was Overly Prejudicial
On cross-examination, over objection, the State elicited testimony and submitted

a photograph regarding a lawn chair with a smiley face and a tongue sticking out.
(Tr., p.378, L.4 - p.386, L.1.)

Ms. Rothwell testified that the chair is "a Wal-Mart chair,

a yellow lawn chair with a smily [sic] face and its tongue sticking out, and we've had it
for eleven years, and I honestly don't even see it any more. It's just there." (Tr., p.384,
Ls.10-13.) The prosecution, after asking several questions about a possible message
the chair could be sending, asked "And you're telling us that chair wasn't positioned in
that photograph to send a message to the mother and daughter?" (Tr., p.382, L.7 16

p.384, L.16.) Mrs. Rothwell answered, "That's exactly what I'm telling you .... It was
not intended to send a message." (Tr., p.384, L.17 - p.385, L.4.) After the questioning
and over objection, the photograph was admitted. (Tr., p.385, L.21 - p.386, L.4.)
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
I.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible; conversely, irrelevant evidence
is inadmissible. I.R.E. 402. Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that is
freely reviewed. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008).
In the case at hand, relevant evidence is evidence related to whether or not
Mr. Rothwell committed the charged offense. Certainly, the placement of a lawn chair in
Mr. Rothwell's parents' yard, a chair they had owned since Mr. Rothwell was eight or
nine years old, did not have any relevance to the charge. The chair did not depict any
overt sexual acts. It was erroneous to speculate that the chair was sending a negative
message.

Simply, as was testified to, it was just a lawn chair sitting out in the

Rothwell's lawn.

It did not make it anymore probable that the charged offense was

committed. As such, it is not relevant.
Assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial effect
outweighs any limited probative value.

I.R.E. 403 states that "Although relevant,

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice ... " I.R.E. 403.
When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied.

State v.

Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993). I.R.E. 403 creates a balancing test. On one
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hand, the trial judge must gauge the probative worth of the proffered evidence by
focusing upon the degrees of relevance and materiality of the evidence, and the need
for the issue on which it is to be introduced. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107
(1987). At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the
evidence amounts to unfair prejudice. Id.
To some extent all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho
83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989).

The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it

harms the defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict
regardless of other facts presented. Id.
As noted above, the evidence has little to no probative value. Mrs. Rothwell's
testimony further limited any potential relevance as she testified that the chair was not
placed to send a message to the alleged victim and victim's family. However, there is a
danger of prejudice to Mr. Rothwell as the line of questioning plants the idea that the
prosecutor and Ms. Noonan both believed that the chair was intentionally placed in the
Rothwell's yard to send some type of malicious message. The admittance of this
evidence works to portray the entire Rothwell family as vile people who want to
continually upset the alleged victim and her family. Moreover, it attempts to show that
Mr. Rothwell's family believed that Mr. Rothwell had committed the alleged acts and
were trying to harass the alleged victim about the conduct. Regardless of the fact that
the testimony did not bear out any of the prejudicial purposes for admitting the
evidence, its potential for unfair prejudice remains. Because the evidence's prejudicial
effect outweighs any potential probative value, Mr. Rothwell asserts that the district
court abused its discretion in admitting the exhibit and in allowing the prosecution to
question Mrs. Rothwell about the chair.
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1.

The Admittance Of The Evidence Was Not Harmless Error

The harmless error standard was discussed in section I(C)(1) above and is
incorporated herein by reference.
harmless.

Mr. Rothwell contends that this error was not

Because there was a timely objection, Mr. Rothwell only has the duty to

prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating
that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
222 (2010). The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case.
III.
The State Violated Mr. Rothwell's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial
Misconduct
"[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of
'due process.'" Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, U[n]o
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state

shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that,

"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

10. CONST. art. I, §13.

Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair.

Schwarlzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so
unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483
U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial
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misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant's
right to a fair trial.

The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged

Id.

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).

The aim of due process is not the

punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial
to the accused. Id.
A.

Standard Of Review
Because Mr. Rothwell's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in

constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006). Trial error ordinarily will not
be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v.
Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). For alleged errors for which there was a

timely objection, Mr. Rothwell only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at
which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).

On appeal,

Mr. Rothwell also raises instances of un-objected to misconduct. Because these claims
of error are raised for the first time on appeal, Mr. Rothwell must establish that the
errors are reviewable as "fundamental error." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court recently
revisited fundamental error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for fundamental
error:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
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Id. (footnote omitted).

Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first

show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights" and that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear,
or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry
test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e., that there is a
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226-228.
B.

The State Violated Mr. Rothwell's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Closing argument "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the

trier of fact in a criminal case."

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007)

(quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose "is to enlighten
the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence."

Id. (quoting

State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450 (Ct. App. 1991 )). "Both sides have traditionally

been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to
discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom."

Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)).

However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those
implied. Id.
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court,
and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more
credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the
presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9
Idaho 35, _ , 71 P. 608, 610 (1903).

The prosecutor's duty is to see that the

defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence and should avoid
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presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The prosecutor must refrain
from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
1.

Misconduct For Which There Was An Objection:
The Prosecution
Committed Misconduct By Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices Of
The Jury

After correctly reminding the jury that they should not consider penalty or
punishment, Prosecutor Verharen made the following statements:
The last reason why you shouldn't acquit this man even though the
evidence proves him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is because of the
crime itself. This isn't some Mr. Reuter: Excuse me, Your Honor. I apologize for interrupting. I
just want to reiterate or make it clear that this is not an appeal to passions
or prejudice, trying to emote rather than argue. Thank you. . .. He was
getting into this is the type of crime and so forth.
The Court: I understand, and just caution counsel on your third
point. The objection's noted . . . . To the extent it's understood, it's
overruled. Go ahead, Mr. Verharen.
Mr. Verharen: You know what happened in this case. He doesn't
deserve to be set free. Thank you.
(Tr., p.511, L.23-p.512, L.15.)
The prosecutor's statements amounted to an improper plea for the jury to decide
this case based upon its fears, passions, and prejudices.

In United States v.

Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that such pleas are

wholly improper:
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order
to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future
lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the
defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or
innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that,
convicting a defendant, they will assist in the solution of some pressing
social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a
burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear.
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Id. at 1149 (quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). In Weatherspoon,
where the defendant was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm, portions of the prosecutor's closing argument focused on the personal comfort
and community safety which is attendant to taking armed ex-cons off the streets. Id. at
1149. The Ninth Circuit held that, "[t]hat entire line of argument ... was improper." Id.
Then, after quoting the above language from Koon and Monaghan, it observed that
since Mr. Weatherspoon's case turned solely on the question of whether he had, in fact,
been in possession of a firearm on the night in question, the prosecutor's arguments
about the "potential social ramifications of the jury's reaching a guilty verdict," were
"irrelevant and improper" because "[t]hey were clearly designed to encourage the jury to
enter a verdict on the basis of emotion rather than fact." Id. at 1149-1150. See also

State v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 462-463 (2002) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where
the prosecutor made a closing argument statement that was "a direct and unabashed
appeal for the jury to find the defendant guilty out of sympathy for the victim and his
family").
Because the prosecutor's statements in this case, much like the prosecutor's
pleas in Weatherspoon and Payne, were calculated to encourage the jury to reach a
guilty verdict based on its emotion, rather than the facts of the case, they were irrelevant
and improper and their admission violated Mr. Rothwell's rights to a fair trial and due
process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In the case at hand, this Court
should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Rothwell his right to a fair trial because it
cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not contribute to the verdict.
The case was not clear cut and was primarily based upon the jury's credibility
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determination of both the alleged victim and Mr. Rothwell, as they were the only
individuals present in Mr. Rothwell's room and the DNA evidence was very limited,
providing little insight at to whether any sexual contact occurred. In reviewing the trial
as a whole, the prosecutor's improper comments, constituting misconduct, may have
influenced the jury in this case. As such, this Court must vacate the conviction.
2.

Misconduct For Which There Was No Objection: The Prosecution
Committed Misconduct By Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices Of
The Jury And Misrepresenting Evidence To Jury
a.

To The Extent That This Court Determines That The Last
Statement Of The Above Misconduct Was Not Objected To,
Mr. Rothwell Asserts The Appeal To The Passions And Prejudices
Of The Jury Should Be Reviewed As Fundamental Error

Following an objection, the prosecution stated: You know what happened in this
case. He doesn't deserve to be set free. (Tr., p.512, Ls.14-15.) Case law regarding
appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury can be found in section IV(2)(B)
and is incorporated herein by reference.
b.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct When It Misrepresented
Evidence To The Jury

It is a long-standing rule that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause
prevents state governments from obtaining convictions based on a prosecutors'
knowing use offalse evidence.

Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). This goes not only

to wholly fabricated evidence, such as was the prosecutor's downfall in Pate, but also to
arguments which misstate the evidence adduced at trial.

Thus, in United States v.

Fearns, the Seventh Circuit ordered that the defendant be retried where the prosecutor
had tried to bolster the credibility of one of the government's witnesses by telling the jury
that that witness had made a prior consistent statement, but where no evidence had
ever been offered as to that alleged prior consistent statement. Fearns, 501 F.2d at
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488-489. Therefore, a prosecutor cannot misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence
during his closing arguments. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following statements:
[A]nd while he was in the bathroom this little six-year-old girl started
rooting around in his bedroom. She apparently put her hand into his
wastebasket. She touched some of his old tissues that he has some
semen on from a couple days ago, and then this little girl touched her face
after she'd touched his two-day-old semen and got some of his semen on
his face - on her face.
Now the defendant came back after he was in the bathroom and
after he left this little girl alone unattended in a room full of his guns that
have their bolts in them ...
(Tr., p.485, Ls.11-22.)
This information is directly contrary to the evidence offered.

Mr. Rothwell

testified specifically that on the date in question, when A.N. was in his room, "The bolts
were out of the guns." (Tr., p.429, L.25.) And, that the bolts for each of the guns were
in an entertainment center where they would not be easy to locate. (Tr., p.430, Ls.1-8.)
Later, after being asked about the bolts being in the guns on a different occasion,
Mr. Rothwell continued to maintain that the bolts would have been out on the date of the
alleged incident. (Tr., p.450, Ls.9-25.)
The prosecution has also framed the information about tissues and semen in a
way to portray to the jury that this was Mr. Rothwell's explanation of events. However,
when the prosecutor specifically asked Mr. Rothwell about this information he stated
that he supposed there could have been some tissues with semen in his waste basket
and that it could be possible she touched them; however, he never asserted that this
was what actually occurred or offered this as his version of events. (Tr., p.447, L.1 p.449, L.12.)
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In

both

instances,

the

prosecution's

statements

amounted

to

a

mischaracterization of the evidence and, as such, were misconduct.
Later the prosecutor noted that:
The bottom line here is that what this little girl said happened, and it's
backed up or corroborated, if you will, by the testimony of other people, by
her mom, by the nurse, by Detective Oyler, by her prior testimony at the
preliminary hearing.
(Tr., p.510, Ls.21 - 25.)
The prosecutor's statements note that AN.'s testimony has been corroborated by
several other individuals.

However, the statements by these individuals were not

offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Specifically, AN.'s mother testimony, that
AN. told her that "Randy made me lick his penis," was objected to as hearsay, the State
explained that it was being offered as foundational to the defendant's next statement.
(Tr., p.249, Ls.4-19.)
Similarly, Detective Oyler was then allowed to testify about his interview with AN.
regarding statements that were constant with those made at trial. (Tr., p.295, Ls.18 p.312, L.21.)

When defense counsel objected to the questioning about consistent

statements, the prosecution stated that they were offered to rehabilitate AN. after cross
examination pointing out inconsistent statements, the objection was overruled.
(T r., 31 0, L. 18 - p. 311, L. 13.)
Prior consistent statements used to rehabilitate a witness's testimony are not
hearsay pursuant to I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(8). Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(8) states the
following:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is ... (8) consistent with declarant's testimony and is offered
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to rebut an express or implied charge against declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive ....
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(8).

Prior consistent statements may be offered to show that the

witness did not recently fabricate testimony. Id. Such statements are not hearsay
because they are not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
declaration, but to show the credibility of the witness. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727,
732 (2001).

As such, the statements were admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence

801(d)(1)(8), to "rebut an express or implied charge against declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive." Therefore, Detective Oyler's statements
that AN. had been consistent about "either licking his penis or sucking it like a lollipop,
rubbing his penis" were only admissible for refuting the defendant's charge of recent
fabrication, improper influence, or motive, not for the truth of the matter asserted. The
prosecution's use of statements that were admissible for a limited purpose as
admissible for the truth of the matter asserted is a misrepresentation of the evidence
and amounts to misconduct.
The prosecutor undoubtedly misrepresented the evidence before the jury in his
closing arguments.

The prosecutor's comments in this case, were calculated to

encourage the jury to reach a guilty verdict based upon facts which were not in
evidence; and the admission of the comments violated Mr. Rothwell's rights to a fair trial
and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
c.

The Misconduct Is Reviewable As Fundamental Error

First, it is a violation of Mr. Rothwell's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial
to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial
and the law as explained in the jury instructions. As such, prosecutorial misconduct, in
general, directly violates a constitutional right.
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It should be noted that the Idaho

Supreme Court stated in Perry that, "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict
on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry,
150 Idaho at 227.

This is an implicit recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court that

prosecutorial misconduct claims are connected to a constitutional provision.
In this case, the misconduct also interfered with the jury's ability to make an
impartial decision, thereby interfering with Mr. Rothwell's Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury. The State violated Mr. Rothwell's right to a jury trial when the prosecutor
attempted to encroach upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to weigh the evidence
or lack of evidence presented.

"The right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth

Amendment. .. includes the right to have the jury be 'the sole judge of the weight of
the testimony.'"

State v. Elmore, 154 Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d 760 (WA 2010)

(quoting State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d 825, 838, 889 P.2d 929 (WA 1995) (quoting
State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250-51,60 P. 403 (1900)).
The misconduct in this case not only involved Mr. Rothwell's state and federal
constitutional rights to due process, but also his federal and state constitutional rights to
a jury trial. As such, the error is reviewable for fundamental error. The error in this case
plainly exists from the record and no additional information is necessary.

Further, it

cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury reach a verdict,
not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible grounds presented
through misconduct.
The prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the conviction. In the case at
hand, this Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Rothwell his right to a fair
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trial because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not
contribute to the verdict. The case was not clear cut and was primarily based upon the
jury's credibility determination of both the alleged victim and Mr. Rothwell, as they were
the only individuals present in Mr. Rothwell's room and the DNA evidence was very
limited, providing little insight at to whether any sexual contact occurred. In reviewing
the trial as a whole, the prosecutor's improper comments, constituting misconduct, may
have influenced the jury in this case. As such, this Court must vacate the conviction.
3.

If This Court Finds That The Error Was Harmless, It Should Nonetheless
Remand The Case In Order To Discourage Further Prosecutorial
Misconduct

"Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
unfairly." Brady v. Maryland, 3 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

In State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho

346509 P.2d 331 (1973), the Idaho Supreme Court, when reviewing a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, quoted the language of the United States Supreme Court
which found:
'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.
I

Id. at 353-354, 509 P.2d at 338, 339 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935) (emphasis added)).
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The prosecutor's office in question, the Kootenai County Prosecutor's Office, has
exhibited a pattern of repetitious misconduct, repeatedly crossing the line between
earnest prosecution, and striking foul blows. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011)
(finding numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct, but vacating conviction on
other grounds); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) (finding misconduct in eliciting
testimony intended to vouch for the credibility of a witness and in arguing during closing
that the witness should be believed because that witness' credibility had been vouched
for, but concluding that such misconduct did not satisfy the new standard for
fundamental error); State v. Bebee, 145 Idaho 570 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the
prosecutor's comments which misstated the evidence and amounted to an appeal to the
jury to consider factors other than evidence of guilt amounted to prosecutorial
misconduct and warranted a new trial); State v. Phil/ips, 144 Idaho 82 (Ct. App. 2007)
(finding that the prosecutor's comments that the jury should be "irritated" and "upset"
with the defense constituted prosecutorial misconduct and warranted a new trial);
State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that prosecutor's comment

suggesting the defendant was a threat for future sexual abuse was misconduct but
found it was harmless); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the
prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by introducing facts not in
evidence and suggesting that if the defendant was not convicted, neither he nor his wife
would be held responsible for their child's injury although finding it harmless); State v.
Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the prosecutor calling the defendant a

"liar and a thief" and expressly accusing him of committing perjury during closing
arguments constituted misconduct but found harmless error.) State v. Gadberry, Docket
Nos. 26604/26605 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2001) (unpublished opinion) (finding misconduct
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in eliciting comments on the defendant's silence, but finding that error to be harmless);
State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding prosecutor's question to be
"improper," but not so egregious as to constitute fundamental error; finding prosecutor's
closing argument to be "not completely accurate," but not so egregious as to constitute
fundamental error; finding portions of prosecutor's closing argument "troubling," but
holding that they "appear" to be appropriate, or at least not so egregious as to constitute
fundamental error; and finding that prosecutor's closing argument "did misstate the
evidence to a degree," but that the deviations were not significant enough to "have a
meaningful impact on the outcome of the trial" and, thus, not so egregious as to
constitute fundamental error); State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709 (1999) (vacating
conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct in commenting on defendant's silence);
State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding prosecutor's question to be
improper, but finding the misconduct to be harmless in light of the district court's
admonishment that the jury should disregard the question); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho
587 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding prosecutor's question to be misconduct, but finding the
misconduct to be harmless).
In his concurring opinion in Phillips, Judge Schwartzman stated:
This case represents yet another in a long line or pattern of repetitious
misconduct from this prosecutorial office. A catalogue of cases in which
the doctrine of "harmless error" has reared its head and saved the
conviction on appeal creates a less than enviable appellate track record
.... As our own Supreme Court has noted ... :
"Mistakes must not become the practice instead of the exception. A court
on observing that a pattern of mistakes has developed, on seeing yet
another "mistake," might readily decide to view such circumstance with a
jaundiced eye, and rule accordingly."
/d. at 89 (internal citations omitted) (quoting State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,984 n. 1,
(1992».
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Although this Court, when determining whether there was prejudice in this case,
must focus on whether Mr. Rothwell received a fair trial and not on the culpability of the
prosecutor, Mr. Rothwell requests that this Court follow the urging of Justice Blackmun
in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), and discourage prosecutorial misconduct
by remanding his case for a new trial.
Twice during the past year. . . and again today -- this Court has been
faced with clearly improper prosecutorial misconduct during summations.
Each time, the Court has condemned the behavior but affirmed the
conviction. Forty years ago, Judge Jerome N. Frank, in dissent, discussed
the Second Circuit's similar approach in language we would do well to
remember today:
"This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing
government counsel for such conduct as that of the [prosecutor] here. But,
each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an
attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual
condonation of counsel's alleged offense, coupled with verbal
disapprobation. If we continue to do nothing practical to prevent such
conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. For otherwise it will be as
if we declared in effect, 'Government attorneys, without fear of
reversal, may say just about what they please in addressing juries,
for our rules on the subject are pretend-rules. If prosecutors win
verdicts as a result of "disapproved" remarks, we will not deprive them of
their victories; we will merely go through the form of expressing
displeasure. The deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such
occasions are purely ceremoniaL' Government counsel, employing such
tactics, are the kind who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the small
price of a ritualistic verbal spanking. The practice of this court -- recalling
the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the oysters -- breeds a
deplorably cynical attitude towards the judiciary" (footnote omitted).
Darden, 477 U.S. at 205-206 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In the case

at hand, the prosecutor struck "foul blows" and deprived Mr. Rothwell of his right to a
fair trial.
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IV.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Rothwell's Fourteenth
Amendment Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of
Errors Deprived Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Rothwell asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were harmless,
the district court's errors combined amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error
doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be
harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the
defendant's constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635
(Ct. App. 2002).

In order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that

there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then conclude that these
errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho
160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under that doctrine, even when individual errors are deemed
harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair trial.
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994). However, a finding of cumulative error
must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128 Idaho
19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Rothwell asserts that the district court's errors in his trial amounted to actual
errors depriving him of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are found
in sections I, II, and III above, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by
reference.
V.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion With It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Rothwell
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.
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State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). The decision to place a defendant on probation, or
instead, relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion
of the district court, and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-206
(Ct. App. 1990).

Mr. Rothwell contends the district court abused its discretion in

relinquishing jurisdiction in light of the recommendation of probation by the North Idaho
Correctional Institution, his desire to participate in treatment, his acceptance of
responsibility and remorse, his friend and family support, young age, and the
rehabilitative efforts he made during the period of retained jurisdiction.
During the period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Rothwell was able to complete
Personal Finance I, Workforce Readiness, Career Planning and Portfolio, and
demonstrated amenability to treatment in his Sex-Offender Assessment Group.
(Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI) 10/12/11, p.1;
APSI 5/9/11, p.1.) He received recommendations for probation in both reports from the
North Idaho Correction Institution.

(APSI 5/9/11, p.5; APSI 10/12/11, p.5.)

The

recommendation was made because he showed progress in his maturation and began
to demonstrate that can show empathy to others. (APSI 10/12/11, p.5.)
Mr. Rothwell was only eighteen years old when the instant offense occurred.

(PSI, p.1.) The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized a point first made by Justice
Bistline in his dissent in State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75 (1978), that in modifying
sentences, the Court "has given great weight to the age of a defendant."
Broadhead, 120 Idah0141, 144 (1991) (citations omitted).
counsels toward a less sever sentence.
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State v.

Mr. Rothwell's young age

Additionally, while on his rider, Mr. Rothwell began to accept responsibility for
committing the instant offense. He has also expressed his remorse. In State v. Alberts,
121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence
imposed, "In light of Alberts' expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his
problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his
character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204. Mr. Rothwell made statements at each of the retained
jurisdiction review hearings showing that he had recognized that he was accountable
and expressed his remorse for his actions:

Mary, I'm sorry for what I did to you and your family, not only physically
but what I mentally did by putting you though the trial and not being
mature enough to admit to what I had done to your family and to you. I
apologize for everything that I did. Your healing could've started a year
and a half before it did if I would've just been mature enough to accept
responsibility for the actions that I did to you and your family. I apologize.
You Honor, uh, when you first sentenced me to my rider, I wasn't
very acceptable to it. It took me a long time to realize that, uh, I needed to
admit not only to my family but to myself that what I did was wrong, and
that I needed to help to realize just how much suffering I caused and how
much pain and sorrow I caused not only Mary and [A.N.] but also my
family, and, uh, you know when I got down on my rider I still - I fought with
my - with my counselor and I fought with my group. I didn't want to admit
what I did. I didn't want to admit to myself the damage that I caused, and,
uh, the last month that I was there I really started to open up and I started
to take feedback from my group. I started to listen to my counselor. I
started to listen to myself because I was telling myself all along that what I
did was wrong, that I should've just admitted to it in the first place and not
put A.N. and Mary though the trial like I did, calling them liar[s], saying that
I didn't do anything when I knew that I had done it, and when I finally
started to realize that, I realized how grateful that I was to the courts for
allowing me a chance at my rider so I could see more in depth of myself
and what I needed to work on, both all my issues, sexually and nonsexually and, uh, if placed on probation, I, uh - I will jump at the chance to
start treatment. I've already, uh, talked to them. All I have to do is make a
phone call, and I can start treatment as soon as possible .... It'd be Valley
Treatment Specialties in Clarkston, Washington.
I just wanted to
apologize for taking the Court's time, wasting the months that I could've
spent healing on a trial for something that I did and I should've accepted,
and, uh, I appreciate the opportunity that you allowed me to have to look
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into myself and realize the flaws that I had and that I wish to change them.
I will take what I learned from my rider wherever I go.
(Tr.5/17/11, p.89, L.12 - p.91, L.9.) Months later, at the second hearing, Mr. Rothwell
again made similar statements:
I wanted to start off by thanking you for giving me not one but two
opportunities to do a rider, um, that I learned a lot from my riders. Um, I'd
also like to point out that I am not a perfect human being, and I did slip up
while I was on my rider, and I took those slip-ups and learned from them
to help me continue my growing and to mature into somebody that could
be a positive member of society.
Um, I would like to tell you that if granted probation, I will
immediately start treatment with Valley Treatment Specialties. I have an
appointment set up to go and talk to them, um, and I also have a letter
stating that upon getting recommended for probation, an evaluation from,
uh, Mr. Jemmison from Cottonwood that I could be approved, um, upon
release from incarceration to go to that outpatient treatment. Um, I will
find employment, um, if not in a - at a logging site then, uh, in town at
Potlatch or Moscow or Lewiston while I go to school to acquire my heavy
equipment operator's license so that way I have a career, not just a job.
Um, I will be living with my grandparents, um, Marge and Raymond
Lienhard in Princeton, Idaho, um, while going to treatment in Clarkston,
Washington.
Um, I would also like to take this opportunity to take ownership for
the actions that I committed against [A.N.] and [A.N.]'s family. I know they
were wrong, and I apologize for any sufferings or effects that my actions
have caused on their family. Um, I would just - I would like to take the
opportunity to prove that I can do probation and become a positive
member of society and grow and mature into somebody who can help
benefit the community.
(T r. 11 /17/11, p. 107, L. 6 - p. 108, L. 13.)
At the final rider review hearing, Mr. Rothwell presented an amended probation
plan to the district court, addressing the court's concerns. Mr. Rothwell was unable to
find daily treatment, but did schedule his first treatment session and had money to begin
immediately and continue treatment. (Tr.11/30/11, p.129, L.12 - p.130, L.1.) He also
located transitional housing and a sponsor to assist him though the process and help
him locate more permanent housing. (Tr.11/30/11, p.130, L.2-25.) Mr. Rothwell was
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also willing to go to other programs to ensure that he was in daily programming,
although not necessarily related to sex offender treatment. (Tr.11 /30/11, p.131, Ls. 1-9.)
Mr. Rothwell also had a lead on potential employment at Sam's Cycle Shop.
(Tr.11/30/11, p.131, Ls.5-9.)
Mr. Rothwell also read a letter he wrote as part of his programming at
Cottonwood:
[A.N.], I am writing this letter to apologize for my behavior of
sexually abusing you. Never should've exposed myself to you or had you
lick my penis. Never should've tricked you into entering my home in order
to assault you sexually. I would like to try to help you understand the
abuse you suffered is my fault, not yours. I am to blame, and I take full
responsibility for manipulating you into licking my penis. I was the adult.
You should've been able to trust me to act like a responsible adult and
keep you safe, instead of using you in a sexual way to meet my own
gratifications. I was wrong to treat you the way I did. My actions and
behaviors were not responsible or mature. You never should've been put
through this sexual abuse or the suffering that have followed this horrible
experience. I wanted to apologize for creating the sufferings that you are
going through. The effects of my abuse that you suffered are my fault, not
yours. You never should've been exposed to the sexual experiences so
young. If I would've been mature enough to accept responsibility for the
abuse that I did to you, you wouldn't have had to go though the court
proceedings or go to trial, and your healing could've started months
sooner. I realize you must hate me for causing these sufferings in your
life, and I realize you may regret ever meeting me, and I'm sorry that you
had to experience those feelings at such a young age because of the
actions I chose to take by bringing you into my home and making you lick
my penis for my own gratification. You should not blame others for the
sexual abuse of the effects or the effects of that abuse. It is no one's fault
but my own. I chose to sexually assault you. Sexual abuse you suffered
- suffered from me is not your fault. You never asked me to be anything
other than the adult I should've been.
I know your road to recovery will be a long one, but with your family
and friends support and help from all of your resources available to you
you can accomplish your recovery knowing that the abuse you suffered is
not your fault and that people that you meet in life will not try to manipulate
you for their own sexual desires.
(Tr.11/30/11, p.131, L.20-p.133, L.11.)
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Furthermore, Mr. Rothwell has significant friend and family support. In State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that family and
friend support were factors that should be considered in the Court's decision as to what
is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Rothwell noted that he loves his parents and that
they love him. (PSI, p.7.) Marjorie Lienhard, Mr. Rothwell's grandmother, wrote a letter
of support for Randall noting that he is loving, has a great work ethic, and has a great
attitude.

(PSI Attachment, Letter from Marjorie Lienhard.)

Among other things,

Mr. Rothwell's father, Steve Rothwell, wrote that Randall was "a gift from God.

A

wonderful person, a loving person, he is great human being." (PSI Attachment, Letter
from Steve Rothwell.)

Teresa Rothwell, Randall's mother, wrote that he is people

person, a good listener, empathetic, a hard worker, thoughtful and "one of the most
loving, caring people I have ever known. He looks out for his fellow man and cares very
much for his friends and family. He is always there when you need him and he always
does what he says he is going to do, as any good man should." (PSI Attachment, Letter
from Teresa Rothwell.)
Andrew Simms, a lifetime friend, wrote that:
Randall has always been an amazing person. He has always been a
caring person, the first one to pitch in if someone needed help. He has
always been that way and together we did a lot of odd jobs for folks in the
neighborhood, handling the heavy work for them whenever we could ....
Randall has always put his family and friends first. If anyone of his family
or friends needed any kind of help he was always there to provide
assistance. Whether it was fixing something or building something or
bringing in the firewood for the year, he has always been the guy that
would get it done and one time, with the best quality he could provide ....
All in all, Randall has always been a loving, caring, helpful, and fun guy
that has always been on the road to success.
(PSI Attachment, Letter from Andrew Simms.)

Mr. Rothwell also provided letters of

support from his grandfather, Raymond Lienhard, grandmother, Leatha Rothwell,
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friends Devin and Nicole McConnell and family friend, Joyce Harbison.

(PSI

Attachments, Letter from Raymond Uenhard; Letter from Leatha Rothwell; Letter from
Devin McConnell; Letter from Nicole McConnell; and Letter from Joyce Harbison.)
Additionally, in 2005, Mr. Rothwell was nominated as a Hometown Hero in the
American Red Cross' Youth Humanitarian Hero for his efforts in attempting to rescue a
young man from drowning at Hauser. (PSI Attachment, Letter from Abi Weaver.) His
father summarized Mr. Rothwell's involvement at the sentencing hearing stating, "Randy
jumped in to save a life. There was probably thirty people standing around. Me and
Randy went in, and we went down to the bottom of the lake, and Randy pulled the
person up, and we brought him to shore and did everything we could for him."
(Tr., p.554, Ls.7-13.)
Based upon the above information, Mr. Rothwell contends the district court
abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction in his case.
VI.

Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Rothwell
To A Unified Sentence Of Twenty-Five Years, With Six Years Fixed, And When It Failed
To Reduce His Sentence Upon Relinquishing Jurisdiction
Mr. Rothwell asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when
it failed to sua sponte reduce his sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction. Additionally,
Mr. Rothwell asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of twenty-five
years, with six years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,577 (1979)). Mr. Rothwell does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Mr. Rothwell must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.

Id. (quoting State v.

Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382,384 (1978)).
Mr. Rothwell asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight to the
mitigating factors that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court
failed to give proper consideration to his desire to participate in treatment, his
acceptance of responsibility and remorse, his friend and family support, young age, and
the rehabilitative efforts he made during the period of retained jurisdiction.

These

factors were discussed in detail in section V, above, and the information is incorporated
herein by reference.
Based upon the above information, Mr. Rothwell asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him and by failing to
reduce his sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Rothwell respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and
sentence and to remand his case to the district court with instructions that he be granted
a new trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order
relinquishing jurisdiction and remand his case to the district court with instructions that
he be placed on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Rothwell respectfully requests that this
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.

th day of April, 2012.
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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